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O ver the last three decades, macroeconomic theory and the practice ofmacroeconomics by economists have changed significantly—for thebetter. Macroeconomics is now firmly grounded in the principles of
economic theory. These advances have not been restricted to the ivory tower. Over
the last several decades, the United States and other countries have undertaken a
variety of policy changes that are precisely what macroeconomic theory of the last
30 years suggests.
The evidence that these theoretical advances have had a significant effect
on the practice of policy is often hard to see for policymakers and advisers who
are involved in the hurly-burly of day-to-day policy making, but easy to see if one
steps back and takes a longer-term perspective. Examples of the effects of theory
on the practice of policy include increased central bank independence; adop-
tion of inflation targeting and other rules to guide monetary policy; increased
reliance on consumption and labor taxes instead of capital income taxes; and
increased awareness of the costs of policies that distort labor markets.
Three key developments in academic macroeconomics have shaped mac-
roeconomic policy analysis: the Lucas critique of policy evaluation due to Robert
Lucas (1976), the time inconsistency critique of discretionary policy due to Finn
Kydland and Edward Prescott (1977), and the development of quantitative
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models following Finn Kydland
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and Edward Prescott (1982).1 Lucas argued that economic theory implies that
preferences and technology are invariant to the rule describing policy but that
decision rules describing the behavior of private agents are not. In a series of
graphic examples, he showed that then-standard policy analyses, which pre-
sumed invariance of decision rules, led to dramatically undesirable policy
prescriptions. Kydland and Prescott argued that a regime in which policymakers
set state-contingent rules once and for all is better than a discretionary regime
in which policymakers sequentially choose policy optimally given their current
situation.
The practical effect of the Lucas critique is that both academic and policy-
oriented macroeconomists now take policy analyses seriously only if they are based
on quantitative general equilibrium models in which the parameters of preferences
and technologies are reasonably argued to be invariant to policy. The time incon-
sistency critique has been a major influence on the practice of central banking and
fiscal policy making over the last 30 years.
The quantitative general equilibrium models that were developed in re-
sponse to the Lucas critique have become increasingly sophisticated over time,
including models with financial market imperfections, sticky prices and other
monetary nonneutralities, imperfect competition, incomplete markets, and
other frictions (Cooley, 1995). These models have yielded four robust proper-
ties of optimal monetary and fiscal policies under commitment: 1) monetary
policy should be conducted so as to keep nominal interest rates and inflation
rates low; 2) tax rates on labor and consumption should be roughly constant
over time; 3) capital income taxes should be roughly zero; and 4) returns on
debt and taxes on assets should fluctuate to provide insurance against adverse
shocks.
Macroeconomists have also been profitably applying the basic tools of general
equilibrium theory, computational techniques, and a deep understanding of key
features of the data to a wide area of phenomena outside of narrowly defined
macroeconomics. These include income differences across countries, fertility be-
havior across time and countries, the dynamics of the size distribution of firms and
the efficiency costs of the welfare state. A good illustration of this kind of work is the
study of differences in labor market performance between the United States and
Europe. Although work of this kind has not yet directly affected policy, it will once
its policy lessons, carefully grounded in theory and data analysis, are clearly com-
municated to policymakers and the public.
Here we have focused on the role of theory shaping policy. In practice, of
course, causality runs in both directions. Theorists often work on problems moti-
vated by specific policy questions and specific experiences. Policymakers’ mind-sets
and attitudes are influenced, perhaps subconsciously, by apparently remote devel-
1 The use of dynamic general equilibrium models in macroeconomics has a long tradition dating back,
at least, to Robert Solow (1956).
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opments in theory. Nevertheless, the most straightforward reading of developments
in macroeconomic policy is that they were strongly influenced by developments in
macroeconomic theory.
Modern Theoretical Developments
Expectations and Macroeconomic Policy Analysis
The Lucas critique led economists to understand that people’s decision rules
change when there is change in the way policy is conducted. Lucas (1976) force-
fully argued that the question “How should policy be set today?” was ill-posed. In
most situations, people’s current decisions depend on their expectations of what
future policies will be. Those expectations depend, in part, on how people expect
policymakers to behave. Macroeconomists now agree, therefore, that any sensible
policy analysis must include a clear specification of how a current choice of policy
will shape expectations of future policies.
To see more concretely why analyzing policy requires specifying how policy will
be set in the future, consider two examples. First, consider a monetary authority
deciding on monetary policy for today. This authority needs to forecast how
variables such as inflation and output will behave now and in the future, which
means that it must forecast private behavior in the future. But the decisions of
private actors depend on their expectations about future monetary policy. If private
actors expect tight monetary policy in the future, they will react to current price
and wage pressures in one way; if they expect loose monetary policy in the future,
they will react differently. Thus, the monetary authority cannot predict how the
economy will respond to a policy decision today unless it can also predict how
people’s expectations of future monetary policy will change as a result of the
current decisions. The monetary authority also needs to predict how its own
behavior will change in the future as a result of its current actions.
Next, consider a fiscal authority deciding how to tax capital income. This
authority needs to forecast how output, investment, and other variables will re-
spond to its decisions. Investment decisions, for example, depend on investors’
expectations of future tax rates. If investors expect future tax rates to be low, then
they’ll invest more today; if high, then less today. Consequently, the fiscal authority
cannot predict how investment will respond, for example, to a tax cut today unless
it knows how people’s expectations of future tax rates will change as a result of the
cut. The fiscal authority also needs to predict how its own future behavior will
change as a result of its current actions.
With this concern over expectations in mind, macroeconomists now agree that
a coherent framework for the design of economic policy consists of three parts: a
model to predict how people will behave under alternative policies, a welfare
criterion to rank the outcomes of alternative policies, and a description of how
policies will be set in the future.
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The environment for which it is easiest to describe how future policies are set
is the commitment regime. In such a regime, all policies for today, tomorrow, the
day after and so on, are set today and cannot be changed. These policies could be
contingent on various events that might occur in the future. The model can then
be used to predict the consequences of various plans for policy and can be used to
find the optimal plan. This procedure has its origins in the public finance tradition
stemming from Ramsey (1927), so this sequence of optimal policies is referred to
as Ramsey policies and their associated outcomes as Ramsey outcomes.
The Time Inconsistency Problem
The Lucas (1976) critique addressed situations in which expectations of future
policies affect current decisions. The Lucas critique thus leads naturally to thinking
about policy evaluation as comparing alternative sets of rules that describe policy
both now and in the future. In practice, of course, societies may not be able to
commit to future policies. In a series of graphic examples, Kydland and Prescott
(1977) (soon followed by Calvo, 1978; Fischer, 1980) analyzed policies with and
without commitment and showed that Ramsey policies are often time inconsistent;
that is, outcomes with commitment are different from those without commitment.
Their examples suggest that time inconsistency problems arise when people’s
current decisions depend on expectations of future policies. Since people’s deci-
sions have been made by the time the future date arrives, the government often has
an incentive to renege on the Ramsey policies.
To better understand this problem, consider again examples from monetary
and fiscal policy. The monetary policy example is motivated by the work of Kydland
and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). Assume that at the beginning
of each period, wage setters choose nominal wages so as to attain a target level of
real wages. The monetary authority then chooses the inflation rate. If inflation is
higher than wage setters expected, then real wages are lower than the target level,
firms demand more labor, and output is higher than its natural rate (which is its
level when real wages are at their target level). The monetary authority wants to
maximize society’s welfare, which is increasing in output and decreasing in infla-
tion. As output increases, the natural assumption is that the marginal benefits of
increases in output fall because of diminishing marginal utility. We assume in
addition that as inflation increases, the marginal costs of increases in inflation rise.
This assumption holds in many general equilibrium models.
To see that there is a time inconsistency problem in this setup, consider the
best outcomes under commitment, the Ramsey outcomes. We think of commit-
ment as a situation in which at the beginning of time society prescribes a rule for
the conduct of monetary policy in all periods. The monetary authority then simply
implements the rule. The best rule under commitment prescribes zero inflation in
all periods. Under this rule, real wages are equal to their target level. To see why
zero inflation is optimal, consider a rule that prescribes positive inflation. Wage
setters anticipate positive inflation and set their nominal wages to be appropriately
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higher. Under this policy, real wages are still at their target level, output is
unaffected, but inflation is positive. Clearly this outcome is worse than one under
a policy that prescribes zero inflation.
Consider next outcomes with no commitment. We think of no commitment as
a situation in which in each period the monetary authority chooses policy optimally
given the nominal wages that wage setters have already chosen. In the resulting
outcome, called the static discretionary outcome, inflation is necessarily positive while
output is at its natural rate. To see why inflation is necessarily positive, suppose, by
way of contradiction, that inflation rates are zero, so that wage setters set their
wages anticipating zero inflation. Once the nominal wages are set, however, the
monetary authority will deviate and generate inflation to raise output. Hence,
inflation must be positive. To see why output is at its natural rate, note that wage
setters rationally anticipate the actions of the monetary authority so that real wages
are at their target level. In the static discretionary outcome, inflation is at a high
enough level so that the marginal cost of deviating to an even higher inflation rate
is equal to the marginal benefit of increased output.
In the case of fiscal policy, a good example of the time inconsistency problem
is based on Kydland and Prescott (1977). Consider a model in which the govern-
ment needs to raise revenue from proportional taxes on capital and labor income
to finance a given amount of government spending. Under commitment, society
chooses a rule for setting tax rates in all periods, and the fiscal authority imple-
ments the rule. At any instant, the stock of capital is given by past investment
decisions; however, the supply of labor can be changed relatively quickly. The key
influence on investment decisions that determine the capital stock in the future is
the after-tax return expected in the future, whereas the key influence on labor
supply decisions is the current after-tax wage rate. So the government’s best policy
for current tax rates is to tax capital at high rates and labor at low rates. This policy
does not distort capital supply decisions, since the capital stock is fixed and
irreversible in that capital goods cannot be directly converted into consumption
goods. The policy also ensures that labor supply is not distorted much, since the tax
rates on labor are low. For future tax rates, the best policy is to commit to set low
rates on capital to stimulate investment and to raise the rest of the needed revenue
with higher rates on labor.
Consider next the outcomes with no commitment. In each period, the fiscal
authority still has an incentive to tax capital income heavily, since the capital stock
is fixed, and to tax labor income lightly to avoid distorting labor supply. Without
commitment, however, investors today rationally expect that high taxes on capital
income will continue into the future—since such taxes are preferred in each time
period—and investment will be low. In equilibrium, the capital stock is smaller than
it would be under commitment, and both output and welfare are correspondingly
lower than they would be under commitment.
The message of examples like these is that discretionary policy making has only
costs and no benefits, so that if government policymakers can be made to commit
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to a policy rule, society should make them do so. Our examples have no shocks. In
stochastic environments, the optimal policy rule is contingent on the shocks that
affect the economy. A standard argument against commitment and for discretion
is that specifying all the possible contingencies in a rule made under commitment
is extremely difficult, and discretion helps policymakers respond to unspecified and
unforeseen emergencies. This argument is less convincing than it may seem. Every
proponent of rule-based policy recognizes the necessity of escape clauses in the
event of unforeseen emergencies or unlikely events. These escape clauses will, of
course, reintroduce a time inconsistency problem, but in a more limited form.
Almost by definition, deviations from such rules will occur rarely; hence, the time
inconsistency problem arising from the escape clauses will be small. Commitment
to a rule with escape clauses is not unworkable.
What can be done to ameliorate the time inconsistency problem short of
commitment? A superficially attractive approach is to pass legislation requiring the
monetary or the fiscal authority to abide by rules. This approach is more problem-
atic than it may seem. In most macroeconomic environments with time inconsis-
tency problems, given an initially established rule, all members of society (or a large
majority) would like to deviate from it. Legislatures will have a strong incentive to
allow the monetary or fiscal authority to deviate from the established rule. To be
effective, therefore, attempts to ameliorate the time inconsistency problem must
impose costs on policymakers of deviating from the earlier agreed-upon rules.
The most widely studied ways to impose such costs rely on either reputation or
trigger strategy mechanisms. Such mechanisms can lead to better outcomes under
discretion than the static discretionary outcomes. Indeed, if policymakers discount
the future sufficiently little, these mechanisms can lead policymakers to choose the
Ramsey outcomes.
Our illustration of such mechanisms draws on Chari, Kehoe, and Prescott’s
(1989) analysis of the Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983)
monetary policy example. Consider the following trigger strategy mechanism in an
infinite-horizon version of this example. In this mechanism, as long as the monetary
authority has chosen the Ramsey policies in the past, wage setters expect it to
continue to do so; however, if the monetary authority has ever deviated from the
Ramsey policies, wage setters expect it to choose the static discretionary policies
forever in the future. With these beliefs of private agents, the monetary authority
understands that if it unexpectedly inflates, it gets a current gain from the associ-
ated rise in output but a loss in all future periods equal to the difference in welfare
between the static discretionary outcome and the Ramsey outcome. In this situa-
tion, if the monetary authority discounts the future sufficiently little, then it will not
deviate. Although the use of trigger strategy mechanisms is appealing, one difficulty
is that many outcomes can result from trigger strategies, and it is not obvious how
society will coordinate on a good outcome.
Another device for ameliorating the time inconsistency problem is to delegate
policy to an independent authority (Rogoff, 1985). One notion of what it means for
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an authority to be independent is that society faces large costs to dismiss the authority
and replace it with another. We illustrate this device in the Kydland and Prescott
(1977) monetary policy example, modified to include potential policymakers who
differ in terms of their aversion to inflation. Suppose the appointed policymaker is
extremely averse to inflation. After wage setters have chosen their nominal wages,
this policymaker finds engineering a surprise inflation very costly. Wage setters
anticipate this behavior, and the outcome is low inflation with output at its natural
rate.
Note that if dismissing the authority is not costly, the delegation device is not
effective. The authority will be dismissed after wage setters have set their nominal
wages, and an authority more representative of society will be appointed. Wage
setters will anticipate this behavior, and the outcomes will simply be the static
discretionary outcomes. Making it costly to dismiss the authority essentially makes
it costly for society to deviate from some set of rules and, hence, introduces a
specific form of commitment.
Yet another device for ameliorating the time inconsistency problem is to set up
institutions that ensure that policies cannot be implemented until several periods
after they are chosen. To see the advantage of such implementation lags, recall the
fiscal policy example. There, without commitment, the optimal policy is to set the
tax rate of capital income high, since the capital stock is determined entirely by past
investment decisions, and to set the tax rate on labor income low, since labor supply
decisions are determined primarily by current tax rates. Suppose that the fiscal
authority still chooses tax rates on capital and labor income, but that now these tax
rates can only be implemented several periods after they are chosen. Under such
institutions, choosing a high tax rate on capital income will tend to reduce
investment, at least until the implementation date, and will lead to a corresponding
reduction in the capital stock. In this environment, the delay in implementation
means that policymakers are forced to confront at least part of the distortions
arising from high capital taxation.
Optimal Rules and Monetary Policy
Macroeconomists can now tell policymakers that to achieve optimal results,
they should design institutions that minimize the time inconsistency problem by
promoting a commitment to policy rules. However, to what particular policies
should policymakers commit themselves? For many macroeconomists considering
this question, quantitative general equilibrium models have become the workhorse
model, and they turn out to offer surprisingly sharp answers. Macroeconomists now
generally agree on four properties that optimal policies should have and on when
qualifications of those properties are appropriate. One of the four properties
applies to monetary policy; the other three, primarily to fiscal policy.
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Optimal Rules for Monetary Policy
In the area of monetary policy, the optimal rule is to set policy so that nominal
interest rates and inflation will be low. This result is due to the celebrated work of
Milton Friedman (1969), which has been defended and supplemented by more
recent work based on standard public finance principles.
Friedman’s argument stems from an analysis of the forces determining money-
holding decisions. Money benefits individuals and therefore society by reducing the
costs of making transactions. From each individual’s perspective, the opportunity
cost of money is the forgone nominal interest that could be obtained by investing
it instead. Individuals equate their marginal benefits from holding and using cash
to the opportunity cost of holding cash. From society’s perspective, the opportunity
cost of producing money is close to zero. Society should conduct monetary policy
so that the nominal interest rate equals the opportunity cost of producing money;
therefore, the nominal interest rate should be close to zero. This recommendation
for monetary policy is known as the Friedman rule. (This rule should not be confused
with a k-percent rule for increasing monetary aggregates over time also advocated
by Friedman.) This recommendation holds in both deterministic and stochastic
environments.
An alternative way to implement the Friedman rule is to pay interest on money.
Although it may be technologically difficult to pay interest on currency, it is
possible to pay interest on checking accounts and other means of making transac-
tions. This reasoning suggests that eliminating policies like Regulation Q that limit
interest payments on demand deposits moves us closer to the Friedman rule.
Phelps (1973) made what looked at first like a compelling argument that a
nominal interest rate close to zero is unlikely to be optimal in practice. He noted
that if government revenue must be raised through distorting taxes, the optimal
policy is actually to tax all goods, including the liquidity services derived from
holding money, so that the optimal interest rate is substantially greater than zero.
In Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), however, we showed that for a class of
economies consistent with the evidence on the absence of long-term trends in the
ratio of output to real balances, a nominal interest rate close to zero is in fact
optimal, even if government revenue must be raised through distorting taxes. For
such economies, money acts like an intermediate good, and for well-known public
finance reasons, taxing intermediate goods is not optimal.
An intuitive way to think about the Friedman rule is that it prescribes the
risk-adjusted real rate of return on money be the same as the (risk-adjusted) real
rate of return on other assets. In a deterministic environment, no risk adjustments
are needed, and the Friedman rule implies deflation at the real interest rate. Some
economists have interpreted the Friedman rule as always requiring deflation at the
real interest rate. In Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe (1996), however, we showed that
this interpretation is mistaken by demonstrating that in a plausible parameterized
stochastic environment, even though the optimal nominal interest rate is still zero,
there is no deflation. Indeed, under the optimal policy, the inflation rate is roughly
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zero because money turns out to be a hedge against real fluctuations, paying out
relatively more in bad times and relatively less in good times. Indeed, money turns
out to be enough of a hedge so that even at zero inflation, its risk-adjusted real rate
of return equals that on other assets.
We turn now to some qualifications. In some well-known macroeconomic
models, positive nominal interest rates are optimal. Typically, in these models, if
the government had a rich enough set of fiscal instruments, then a zero nominal
interest rate would be optimal, but positive nominal interest rates can make sense
if the set of instruments available to the government is restricted.
Positive nominal interest rates are optimal in sticky price models with nominal
prices or wages set in a staggered fashion and in which the government is restricted
to noncontingent nominal debt and noncontingent consumption taxes. Absent
such stickiness, even when the government is so restricted, a nominal interest rate
of zero is optimal and volatile inflation is used to make nominal debt mimic real
state-contingent debt (Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1991). If nominal prices or
wages are set in a staggered fashion, then such inflation volatility is costly because
fluctuations in inflation induce undesirable fluctuations in relative prices. In this
setting, optimal monetary policy trades off two desirable goals: One is to maintain
price stability to avoid the misallocations induced by fluctuations in relative prices.
The other is to minimize the social waste of using inefficient methods of conduct-
ing transactions. Not surprisingly, in this setting, optimal monetary policy involves
a compromise between positive interest rates to reduce inflation and promote price
stability on the one hand, and a nominal interest rate of zero on the other (Benigno
and Woodford, 2003; Khan, King, and Wolman, 2003; Siu, 2004; Schmitt-Grohe´
and Uribe, 2004). The undesirable fluctuations in relative prices can be avoided if
either state-contingent debt or state-contingent consumption taxes are available
(Correia, Nicolini, and Teles, 2004).
Another set of environments where positive nominal interest rates are optimal are
those having a restricted set of assets available to share risk among individuals. In this
setting, lump-sum transfers financed by printing money redistribute income from the
temporarily rich to the temporarily poor. Inflation imposes a larger tax on those who
hold more money and, in this setting, households who hold more money are the
temporarily rich. Such transfers provide a form of risk sharing and therefore help raise
welfare. Optimal monetary policy trades off the benefits of risk sharing, against the
social waste of using inefficient methods of conducting transactions, and involves a
positive nominal interest rate (Levine, 1991). Here, also, a rich enough set of fiscal
policy instruments can provide a partial remedy, sharing risk, and allow the monetary
authority to follow the Friedman rule (da Costa and Werning, 2003).
Thus, modern macroeconomic theory argues that positive nominal interest
rates are optimal only if the set of instruments available to the government is
restricted. Since this situation is highly likely in practice, optimal monetary policy
involves a compromise between the goals of zero nominal interest rates and other
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goals. The robust finding is not that nominal interest rates should be literally zero,
but that nominal interest rates and inflation rates should be low.
The practical definition of low interest rates and inflation rates is a subject of
continuing discussion, particularly because of biases in measuring inflation rates
due to quality changes. Although no consensus has emerged on the definition of
low inflation, most macroeconomists agree that a sustained inflation in excess of
3 percent per year is unacceptably high.
The Evolution of Monetary Policy
Over the last three decades, a variety of specific monetary policy proposals
consistent with developments in macroeconomic theory have been debated and
implemented around the world. Central bankers and other monetary policy-
makers have begun to concentrate on price stability and inflation control as
their main objectives. Many countries have changed their institutional frame-
works for monetary policy making in an apparent recognition of the time
inconsistency problem. These changes have emphasized the importance of
credibility, transparency, and accountability, as well the importance of clear
statements, or rules, about the objectives of monetary policy and the methods by
which that policy will respond to varying circumstances. All these changes point
to a worldwide shift toward the rule-based method of policy making prescribed
by modern macroeconomic theory.
Two kinds of institutional changes are especially evident in the practice of
monetary policy. Central banks have become substantially more independent of the
political authorities, and to an increasing extent, the charters of central banks have
emphasized the primacy of inflation targeting and price stability.
An extensive empirical literature has argued that central bank independence
helps reduce inflation rates without any adverse consequences on output. Figure 1,
which reproduces Figure 1A from Alesina and Summers (1993), shows that coun-
tries with central banks that are more independent tend to have lower inflation
rates. Alesina and Summers (1993) also show that countries with more indepen-
dent central banks do not suffer in terms of output performance. One interpreta-
tion of these findings is that institutions that promote central bank independence
ameliorate the time inconsistency problem. Under this interpretation, the findings
in the literature support the key feature of the Kydland and Prescott (1977)
example: reducing the time inconsistency problem ameliorates inflation but has no
effect on output.
Bernanke, Laubach, Mishkin, and Posen (1999) have argued that inflation
targeting is moving toward a rule-based regime. Their idea (p. 24) is that
“inflation targeting requires an accounting to the public of the projected long
run implications of its short run policy actions.” This accounting can help
ameliorate the time inconsistency problem by ensuring that the long-run im-
plications of short-run policy actions are explicitly taken into account in the
policy-making process.
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In practice, inflation targeting often involves setting bands of acceptable
inflation rates (for example, Bernanke and Mishkin, 1997). In theoretical models
without private information, optimal policy does not involve setting bands, but
rather involves specifying exactly what the monetary authority should do in every
state. In this sense, such models imply that the monetary authority should have no
discretion. Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe (2005) construct a model in which the
monetary authority has private information about the economy and show that the
optimal policy allows for limited discretion in that it specifies acceptable ranges for
inflation and gives the monetary authority complete discretion within those ranges.
In this way, Athey, Atkeson, and Kehoe provide a theoretical rationale for the type
of inflation targeting often seen in practice.
Perhaps the most vivid example of both the movement toward independence
and the movement toward a rule-based method of policy making is to be found in
the charter of the European Central Bank (ECB). Article 105 of the treaty estab-
lishing the central bank states that “the primary objective” of the European System
of Central Banks shall be to “maintain price stability.” Article 107 of the treaty
emphasizes and protects the independence of the central bank by mandating that
“neither the ECB, nor a national central bank, nor any member of their decision-
making bodies shall seek or take instructions from Community institutions or
bodies, from any government of a Member State or from any other body.” Further-
more, the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact contain provisions
restricting fiscal policies in the member countries in order to make the pursuit of
Figure 1
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price stability easier.2 The change in the conduct of European monetary policy is
especially marked for countries other than Germany in the European Monetary Union.
Over the last 20 years, monetary policy in the United Kingdom has also moved
in the direction of greater independence as well as toward rule-based policy
making. After experiencing a major exchange-rate crisis, the United Kingdom
adopted a form of inflation targeting in October 1992. In May 1997 (and subse-
quently formalized by the Bank of England Act of 1998), the Bank of England
gained operational independence from the government. The Bank of England is
now specifically required primarily to pursue price stability and only secondarily to
make sure that its policies are consistent with the growth and employment objec-
tives of the government. The government periodically sets an inflation target,
currently 2 percent, and the central bank is given broad freedom in achieving this
target. As part of the inflation target, the government also sets ranges for acceptable
fluctuations in inflation. If inflation moves outside its target range, the central bank
is required to report on the causes for this deviation, the corrective policy action
the central bank plans to take, and the time period within which inflation is
expected to return to its target range.
The movement toward rule-based monetary policy is widespread. By 2002,
22 countries had adopted monetary frameworks that emphasize inflation targeting
(Truman, 2003). The following countries are listed by the date in which inflation
targeting was adopted (and in some cases readopted): in 1989, New Zealand; in
1990, Chile; in 1991, Canada and Israel; in 1992, the United Kingdom; in 1993,
Australia, Finland, and Sweden; in 1995, Spain and Mexico; in 1997, Czech Repub-
lic and Israel (again); in 1998, Poland and Korea; in 1999, Brazil, Chile (again), and
Colombia; in 2000, Thailand and South Africa; in 2001, Hungary, Iceland, and
Norway; in 2002, Peru and the Philippines. These countries have all openly pub-
lished their inflation targets and have described their monetary framework as one
of targeting inflation. Clearly, inflation targeting is worldwide; the countries range
from developed economies to emerging market economies. The number of coun-
tries adopting inflation targeting is growing over time.
The first country to adopt inflation targeting, New Zealand, has gone the
furthest in setting up a rule-based regime. Before 1989, monetary policy in New
Zealand was far from being rule-based. As Nicholl and Archer (1992, p. 316)
describe: “New Zealand experienced double digit inflation for most of the period
since the first oil shock. Cumulative inflation (on a Consumer Price Index (CPI)
basis) between 1974 and 1988 (inclusive) was 480 percent. . . . Throughout the
period, monetary policy faced multiple and varying objectives which were sel-
dom clearly specified, and only rarely consistent with achievement of inflation
reduction.”
2 Note that these practical concerns are consistent with the work of Sargent and Wallace (1985), who
emphasized that monetary and fiscal policy are linked by a single government budget constraint, so that
responsible monetary policy is impossible without responsible fiscal policy.
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In 1989, the government of New Zealand adopted legislation mandating that
the objective of the central bank be to maintain a stable general level of prices. The
government and the governor of the central bank must agree to a policy target,
which specifies an acceptable range for inflation. Since the act was adopted, the
inflation rate has fallen considerably and has been well below 5 percent per year
over the last decade or so.
Figure 2 displays the inflation experiences for four countries—the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, Canada, and Sweden—that have adopted inflation target-
ing. The four panels of Figure 2 show the inflation rates before and after the date
of the inflation targeting regime, marked by a vertical line. The bands in the figure
depict, for periods following the adoption of an inflation targeting regime, the
target range of inflation specified by the regime. Although the countries did not
always remain within the target range for inflation after adopting inflation target-
ing, inflation fell substantially in all the countries after the adoption of inflation
Figure 2
Examples of Inflation in Discretionary and Targeting Regimes, 1980–98
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targeting. The literature contains ongoing controversy about whether this decline
was solely due to inflation targeting, but also offers substantial consensus that
inflation targeting played an important role in the decline.
Even in countries that have not explicitly adopted inflation targeting, the
institutional framework for the conduct of monetary policy has changed in a way
consistent with modern macroeconomic theory. In the United States, for example, the
central bank has been moving toward openness and targeting for the last 25 years. The
Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (commonly referred to as the
Humphrey–Hawkins Full Employment Act) required the Federal Reserve Board of
Governors to report periodically to Congress on the planned course of monetary
policy. Furthermore, the Federal Reserve Board has changed some policies in ways that
increase transparency. For example, the minutes of Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) meetings are now released substantially sooner than they used to be, and the
FOMC’s decisions regarding its interest rate target are now released immediately after
the meeting. A large academic literature motivated by Taylor (1993) has argued that
the Fed has effectively moved toward a rule-based regime and is therefore well-placed
to solve the time inconsistency problem.
Although the changes in the practice of monetary policy documented above
cannot be definitively linked to the recent theoretical developments in macroeconom-
ics, the most straightforward explanation for these changes is that they are due to the
identification of the time inconsistency problem by macroeconomic theorists.
Optimal Rules and Fiscal Policy
The macroeconomics and public finance literature on proportional tax sys-
tems is based on an analysis indicating that taxes distort two key types of decisions:
the static trade-off between consumption and leisure and the intertemporal trade-
off between current and future consumption.
Taxes on both labor income and consumption distort the static trade-off.
When people contemplate working for an extra hour in the market, they balance
the disutility of the extra work against the utility from the extra consumption they
will have as a result. An extra hour of work at before-tax wage w, with a tax rate on
labor income of l and a tax rate on consumption of c, yields extra after-tax income
of (1  l)w and allows additional after-tax consumption of (1  l)w/(1  c).
This balancing act implies that the distortion of taxes on the labor supply is
summarized by the tax-induced labor wedge , defined so that 1   (1  l)/(1  c).
Notice that consumption taxes distort the static trade-off in much the same way as do
taxes on labor income.
A tax on capital income reduces the return to savings and clearly distorts the
intertemporal trade-off. A constant capital income tax can easily be shown to be
equivalent to an increasing sequence of consumption taxes. Consumption taxes
that rise over time increase the price of future consumption relative to current
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consumption and therefore also distort the intertemporal trade-off. Interestingly,
constant consumption taxes do not change the relative price of consumption over
time and thus do not distort the intertemporal trade-off.
Principles and Properties of Optimal Tax Systems
The problem of designing optimal fiscal policy is to raise the needed amount
of revenue while distorting the static and the intertemporal trade-offs as little as
possible. Studies of optimal fiscal policy have argued that optimal policies should be
based on two principles. First, similar goods should be taxed at similar rates. More
specifically, the consumption of commodities that enter preferences and produc-
tion technologies in similar ways should be distorted in similar ways. Second, if
preferences are homothetic in commodities and separable from labor, then all
commodities should be taxed at a uniform rate.
These principles can be applied to dynamic stochastic economies, such as
those commonly modeled in the macroeconomics literature, by reinterpreting
each commodity as the consumption good at a different date and state. The first
principle—similar goods, similar taxes—implies that the optimal policy is to distort
the static trade-off in the same way at all dates and states. To apply the second
principle, note that in most quantitative general equilibrium models, preferences
are assumed to be homothetic in consumption at different dates and separable
from labor. Since uniform commodity taxation is optimal with these assumptions,
it follows that the intertemporal trade-off should not be distorted.
In dynamic stochastic environments, there is a tax system that is consistent with
these principles and with the requirement that the present value of the government
budget be balanced at each state. This tax system has three properties. First, tax
rates on labor and consumption should be roughly constant over time. Second,
capital income taxes should be roughly zero. Third, returns on debt, and taxes on
assets, should fluctuate so as to balance the government’s budget in a present-value
sense at each state.
To see how the first two properties follow from the principles, note that when
labor and consumption tax rates are constant, the static trade-off is distorted in the
same way in all dates and states. When capital income taxes are zero, the intertem-
poral trade-off is not distorted. The third property follows from the requirement
that the government budget stay balanced in a present-value sense and is a useful
feature of dynamic stochastic models: the intertemporal trade-off does not depend
on the pattern of returns on debt, and taxes across states, but only on an appro-
priately weighted average of taxes across states. To maintain the government
budget balance while keeping tax rates on labor and consumption constant in a
stochastic environment and not distorting the intertemporal trade-off, some other
source of revenue must fluctuate. Appropriately designed state-contingent returns
on debt or state-contingent taxes on assets are such a source of revenue. To see how
state-contingent returns on debt can be such a source of revenue, consider a policy
that issues debt with low returns when revenue needs are high and issues debt with
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high returns when revenue needs are low. This policy can ensure that the govern-
ment budget is balanced in a present-value sense at each state even though taxes on
consumption, labor income, and capital income are roughly the same both across
time and states. Note that under this policy, the government is insuring itself
against fluctuations in revenues and expenditures.
One concern raised with this analysis is that state-contingent government debt
is rarely observed in practice. But this concern is exaggerated because there are
several ways to make implicit returns on government debt state-contingent. One is
to issue nominal debt and let inflation rates be high when revenue needs are high
and low when revenue needs are low. Under this policy, nominal debt that does not
appear to be contingent becomes state-contingent in real terms (Lucas and Stokey,
1983; Lucas, 1986). A second implicit way to make returns on government debt
state-contingent is to issue noncontingent debt at many different maturities and
then use the fluctuations in the term structure of interest rates to induce the
needed fluctuations in the present value of government debt (Angeletos, 2002). A
third way is to combine noncontingent debt with fluctuating consumption taxes to
induce the needed fluctuations in the value of government debt measured in units
of consumption. This approach, however, requires offsetting fluctuations in labor
income taxes to ensure that the distortions in the static trade-off remain roughly
constant (Correia, Nicolini, and Teles, 2004). A fourth way is to have capital income
be taxed when revenue needs are high and subsidized when revenue needs are low
(Chari, Christiano, and Kehoe, 1994). Note that it is essential that the tax system
subsidize capital income when revenue needs are low to ensure that the taxation
when revenue needs are high does not introduce an intertemporal distortion.
When none of these ways of making government debt state-contingent are
available, keeping the static trade-off roughly constant is impossible. Then, as Barro
(1979) and Aiyagari, Marcet, Sargent, and Seppa¨la¨ (2002) have pointed out, labor
income taxes will have a random walk flavor. Others have argued, however, that this
characteristic does not survive in the long run (Werning, 2005).
The Practice of Fiscal Policy
The practice of fiscal policy has not yet changed as dramatically as monetary policy
in response to macroeconomic theory’s changes. Modern macroeconomists apparently
still have much work to do to communicate the policy implications of their theoretical
research. One key insight in particular deserves special emphasis: for optimal economic
results, fiscal policies must minimize intertemporal distortions. The evidence continues
to grow that such distortions can have large effects on aggregate outcomes. Intertem-
poral distortions can arise not only from explicit taxes on capital income but also from
other sources. For example, the prospect of an expropriation of capital acts like a tax
on capital income in terms of the incentives to invest. So does political corruption,
which distorts the production of investment goods.
Intertemporal distortions play a role in accounting for the enormous variabil-
ity in incomes across countries, as illustrated by Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan
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(1997). We found that intertemporal distortions can account for most of the
observed differences in per-capita income across countries. Our argument has two
parts: per-capita income variation across countries is due to variations in capital–
output ratios across countries, and variations in capital–output ratios are due to
variations in intertemporal distortions. Building on the work of Mankiw, Romer,
and Weil (1992), the first part of our argument uses an aggregate production
function that has physical capital, organization capital, and labor as inputs, with a
one-third share of income going to each factor of production. If technology is the
same across countries and physical capital and organization capital are subject to
the same distortions, then the log of output per worker relative to the mean of the
log of output per worker in the world can be shown to be equal to twice the log of
the capital–output ratio relative to the mean of the log of the world capital–output
ratio.3 Figure 3, taken from Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997), plots the rela-
3 With a production function of the form y  Akl 1, it is straightforward to show that
logyl  11  log A 1  log ky .
Using the assumption that A is the same across countries, removing means and setting  2/3 gives the
relationship described in the text.
Figure 3
The Relationship Between Capital–Output Ratios and Relative Income Levels in
125 Countries During the Period 1950–85
4
2
2
0
4
4 2 0 2 4
R
el
at
iv
e 
in
co
m
e 
le
ve
l
L
og
 o
f 
ou
tp
ut
/w
or
ke
r 
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 w
or
ld
 m
ea
n)
Capital–output ratio
2 log (k/y) (relative to world mean)
Source: Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997).
Modern Macroeconomics in Practice: How Theory Is Shaping Policy 19
tionship between the relative log of output per worker against twice the relative
capital–output ratios. Clearly, variations in capital–output ratios play an important
role in accounting for variations in output per worker across countries.
In the second part of our argument in Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (1997),
we noted that the relative price of investment to consumption goods affects
intertemporal decisions. We assumed that variations in this relative price across
countries occur because of distortions emanating from a variety of government
policies. Under this assumption, this relative price can be used to measure the
intertemporal distortions directly. We found that variations in these distortions
across countries can account for most of the variations in capital–output ratios
across countries and that, within a country, fluctuations in the distortions can
produce the type of development miracles and disasters seen in the data. In this
sense, countries that have adopted policies that minimize intertemporal distortions
have been successful and those that have not done so have been unsuccessful.
As the importance of the role of the intertemporal distortions becomes more
widely recognized, minimizing such distortions may be adopted as a standard
fiscal-policy focus in countries of all sizes. If so, theory predicts that poor countries
will have a better chance of becoming rich.
There is some evidence that developed countries are beginning to recognize
the importance of intertemporal distortions in affecting economic performance.
For example, capital income tax rates in the United States have fallen over the last
two decades. Table 1, from Gravelle (2004), displays effective marginal tax rates on
U.S. capital income and shows that these tax rates have fallen from 47 percent in
the 1950s to 28 percent in the 2000s. More recently, in the United States capital
gains tax rates and dividend tax rates have been reduced, and tax-preferred savings
accounts have been expanded considerably.
One reason capital income has historically been taxed heavily may be the time
inconsistency problem of fiscal policy. The fact that capital income taxes have been
falling could be interpreted as indirect evidence that societies and policymakers
Table 1
Effective U.S. Marginal Tax Rates on Capital Income,
1953–2003
Time Period %
1953–59 47.3
1960s 35.8
1970s 41.3
1980s 35.3
1990s 30.5
2000–03 28.3
Source: Gravelle (2004).
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have begun to understand the time inconsistency problem and have begun to make
changes to address it.
Quantitative general equilibrium models have begun to make inroads in the
analysis of tax policy. Although such models have not yet proved to be helpful in
analyzing the role of fiscal policy over the business cycle, they are now an often-used
workhorse in the analysis of fiscal policy over the longer term. For example, in
response to a request from the President’s Advisory Panel on Tax Reform to analyze
the consequences of tax reform proposals, “the Treasury Department used variants
of three standard economic growth models to estimate the dynamic response
associated with the Panel’s reform options . . . a neoclassical growth model, an
overlapping generations (OLG) life-cycle model, and a Ramsey growth model”
(Report on the President’s Advisory Panel, 2005, p. 224).
Extending the Bounds of Macroeconomics
Macroeconomic theorists have long focused on frictions in the labor market as
a source and propagation mechanism for business cycles. Over the last few years, a
significant focus of macroeconomic research has been the effects of government
policies on the secular trends of labor markets. The distinguishing feature of this
research is that it is based on quantitative general equilibrium models along the
lines inspired by Kydland and Prescott (1982). Although the work in this area has
not yet progressed to definitive policy prescriptions, it is beginning to offer pow-
erful insights into what may have caused some problems in labor markets and what
sorts of policy changes might be part of the solutions.
An issue that has captured much scientific and popular attention has been the
recent stubbornly high rates of unemployment in Europe. Figure 4 shows the
behavior of average unemployment rates in Europe and the United States from
1956 to 2003. Until the late 1970s, unemployment was roughly two percentage
points lower in Europe than in the United States. Since about 1980, European
unemployment increased significantly while U.S. unemployment decreased. By
2003, unemployment averaged more than 9 percent in Europe, compared with only
about 5 percent in the United States.
Another way to examine labor markets is to focus on employment rates,
measured as the annual average hours worked per adult of working age. Figure 5
displays the behavior of this measure of employment rates in Europe and the
United States from 1956 to 2003. According to this figure, employment steadily
declined over the entire period in Europe, whereas in the United States, it was
roughly stable until the 1980s and then sharply increased.
What explains these contrasting patterns? The macroeconomics literature has
advanced three explanations for these patterns: labor market rigidities, taxes, and
unemployment benefits.
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Labor Market Rigidities
One widely held view is that labor markets are much more rigid in Europe than
in the United States. For example, legal employment protections making it difficult
to fire workers are typically more stringent in Europe than in the United States.
Hopenhayn and Rogerson’s (1993) general equilibrium model points to two
Figure 4
Unemployment Rates in Europe and the United States, 1956–2003
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opposing ways in which firing costs affect unemployment: the firing costs make
firms more reluctant to fire workers, thereby reducing unemployment; but at the
same time they make firms more reluctant to hire workers in the first place, thereby
raising unemployment. The overall effect is ambiguous and depends on the details
of the microeconomic shocks affecting individual firms’ employment decisions.
Using cross-country evidence, Nickell (1997) finds that the effect of hiring costs is
also ambiguous.
Although the effect of firing costs on unemployment is ambiguous, the effect
on productivity in the Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993) model is not. Firing costs
tend to inhibit the efficient reallocation of labor to more productive firms and
thereby to reduce aggregate productivity. Thus, this model implies that welfare can
be raised by reducing firing costs. Note that if workers cannot borrow against future
earnings to invest in general human capital, then firing costs may provide incen-
tives for firms to invest in such capital and thus raise productivity, as in the models
of Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) and Chari, Restuccia, and Urrutia (2005).
Taxes
Prescott (2002) and Rogerson (2005) have pointed to differences in taxes as a
key source of the differences in European and U.S. labor market experiences. To
study this possibility, the discipline of general equilibrium theory is essential,
because the effect of taxes on labor market outcomes depends not only on how tax
revenue is raised but also, as Rogerson (2005) emphasizes, on how it is used. A tax
has both a substitution effect that reduces the incentive to work and an income
effect that increases the incentive to work, but the way in which tax revenue is spent
can alter the income effects.
To see why, the details of how tax revenues are spent are important. Suppose
first that the revenue is used to provide public goods that are poor substitutes for
private consumption. Then, as long as the utility function has near unit elasticity of
substitution between consumption and leisure, the income and substitution effects
nearly cancel out, so the labor supply effects of taxes are approximately zero. To a
first approximation, the public good expenditures crowd out private consumption
dollar for dollar. Suppose instead that the revenue is either transferred back to
private citizens in a lump-sum fashion or, equivalently, is used to purchase private
goods for citizens. Then taxes have only a substitution effect—because the expen-
ditures offset the income effect—and labor supply falls.
Prescott (2002) cleverly sidestepped these issues by noting that in a general
equilibrium model, the details of the expenditures are captured by their effects on
consumption. Prescott began his analysis by noting that in a general equilibrium
model with a stand-in household, the first-order condition determining labor
supply equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
to the after-tax marginal product of labor. Given consumption and the capital
stock, this condition thus implies a relation between employment and the tax-
induced labor wedge. In this approach, the details of how government revenues are
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spent play a role in determining labor supply only through their effects on
consumption and the capital stock.
Assuming that both the utility function and the production function have unit
elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure, and using long-term
averages to pin down share parameters, Prescott showed that this simple theory
works surprisingly well in accounting for employment observations for the
G-7 countries (that is, the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
and the United Kingdom) for the 1970s and the 1990s. With these functional form
assumptions, if c denotes consumption and l the fraction of time in market work,
the marginal rate of substitution is proportional to c/(1  l ), whereas the after-tax
marginal product of labor is proportional to (1  ) y/l, so that the consumption-
to-output ratio, c/y, summarizes the effects of the details of expenditures as well as
other aspects of the model, such as capital income taxes. Table 2 is reproduced
from Prescott (2002). The closeness between the predictions of his simple model
and the data is remarkable.
The Prescott analysis works well in a comparison of the early 1970s and the
mid-1990s, in part because tax policies clearly changed dramatically during this
time. His analysis works less well in a comparison of the 1950s and the 1970s.
Evidence of large changes in tax rates from the 1950s to the 1970s is hard to find,
even though Figure 5 shows a sustained decline in employment rates over this
period. As Prescott has acknowledged, his analysis does not work well for the
Scandinavian countries, which generally have both high tax rates and high employ-
ment. Rogerson (2005) has built on Prescott’s analysis to allow for secular shifts
from agriculture and industry toward services. Rogerson argued that changes in
taxes and in industry composition can account for the bulk of observed differences
in employment between Europe and the United States.
These analyses focus on the division of time between market work and all
forms of nonmarket activities—including both unemployment and being out of the
Table 2
G-7 Countries’ Predicted and Actual Labor Supply
(Hours worked per week per person aged 15–64)
Country
Tax Rate

Consumption–
Output ratio
c/y
Labor supply in 1970–74
Actual Predicted
Germany .52 .66 24.6 24.6
France .49 .66 24.4 25.4
Italy .41 .66 19.2 28.3
Canada .44 .72 22.2 25.6
United Kingdom .45 .77 25.9 24.0
Japan .25 .60 29.8 35.8
United States .40 .74 23.5 26.4
Source: Prescott (2002).
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labor force. As such, these analyses have sharp implications for the behavior of the
employment rate. Since they do not distinguish between search activities and other
nonmarket activities that lead households to be classified as out of the labor force,
they are silent about differences in unemployment rates between Europe and the
United States.
Unemployment Benefits
One possible reason why the unemployment rate is higher in Europe than in
the United States is that unemployment benefits are more generous in Europe. A
reasonable conjecture is that this greater generosity leads to higher unemployment
rates by making workers more reluctant to accept job offers. The problem with this
conjecture is that it seems contradicted by facts; in the 1960s and 1970s, unem-
ployment benefits were much more generous in Europe than in the United States,
while unemployment rates were lower in Europe than in the United States.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) developed a model that focuses on the division of
time between market work and the search activities of unemployed workers while
abstracting from considerations of nonmarket activities other than search. They
showed that in the 1960s and 1970s, more generous unemployment benefits,
together with higher firing costs, led Europe to have lower unemployment rates
than in the United States, whereas in the 1980s, the same benefits and firing costs
led to the opposite relationship.
The key difference between the earlier and later periods is that microeco-
nomic turbulence, measured as fluctuations in individual worker productivities, has
increased over time in both Europe and the United States (Gottschalk and Moffitt,
1994). As microeconomic turbulence increases, more workers find themselves in
low-productivity jobs as well as in unemployment. If unemployment benefits are
generous, as they are in Europe, then unemployed workers’ reservation wages fall
by only a small amount as turbulence increases, and the flow of workers out of
unemployment does not change much. Hence, with increased microeconomic
turbulence, the overall unemployment rate rises. If unemployment benefits are
meager, as they are in the United States, then workers’ reservation wages fall
sharply as turbulence increases, and the outflow from unemployment rises nearly
one-for-one with the inflow. Hence, the unemployment rate does not change
much.
The Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998) model assumes that workers are risk-
neutral, in which case unemployment compensation has no benefits and is costly
because it distorts the search decision. As the model stands, the policy implication
is that government-provided unemployment benefits should be eliminated. With
risk aversion and imperfections in private markets for unemployment insurance,
unemployment insurance has benefits that need to be weighed against the induced
distortions in search decisions. A growing literature has begun to analyze these
trade-offs (for example, Atkeson and Lucas, 1992; Hopenhayn and Nicolini, 1997;
Shimer and Werning, 2005).
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In our view, explanations of patterns in European and American labor markets
based on labor market rigidities, taxes, and unemployment benefits all have plau-
sible appeal, but the quantitative importance of each has not been definitively
established.
Conclusion
We have argued that macroeconomic theory has had a profound and far-
reaching effect on the institutions and practices governing monetary policy and is
beginning to have a similar effect on fiscal policy. The marginal social product of
macroeconomic science is surely large and growing rapidly.
Those economists caught up in the frenzy of day-to-day policy making often
view their colleagues who toil in the ivory towers of academe as having no power to
affect practical policy and those economists who whisper in the ears of presidents
and Congress members as having the ability to affect policy dramatically. The truth,
we have argued, is very far from this view. The course of practical policy is affected
primarily by the institutions we devise and how well presidents and Congress
members understand economic trade-offs. The day-to-day economic adviser is
useful to the extent that the adviser can educate policymakers about trade-offs, but
is largely irrelevant otherwise. It is easy to see why those economists caught up in
the whirlwind of day-to-day policy making miss the dramatic changes in policy that
result from slow, secular changes in institutions, practices and mind-sets.
The toilers in academe are uniquely placed to develop analyses of institutions
and to educate the public and policymakers about economic trade-offs. The
essence of our argument is that, at least in macroeconomics, these toilers have
delivered large returns to society over the last several decades.
y We thank Kathy Rolfe and Joan Gieseke for excellent editorial assistance. The views
expressed herein are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank
of Minneapolis or the Federal Reserve System.
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